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international court, presents in detail the debates on the project of the court of arbitral justice recommended by the second Hague Conference, and furnishes the text of this project with a valuable commentary. The closing or tenth chapter is devoted to a consideration of "prospects."

On the whole, this new work of Dr. Wehberg's is most suggestive, attractive, and scholarly, and it constitutes a valuable contribution to the subjects of which it treats. On only one point does the reviewer seriously disagree with the views of the author as expressed in this book. He does not agree that *any* tribunal or court of arbitration is well adapted to the decision of important political disputes. For the settlement of these questions we must, at least for a long time to come, continue to look at diplomacy, mediation, or possibly to international legislation.

The volume contains a very full and useful bibliography. It is dedicated to James Brown Scott, American delegate to the second Hague Conference and main author of the American project for the court of arbitral justice.

AMOS S. HERSHEY.

*War and Its Alleged Benefits.* By J. Novicow. Translated by Thomas Seltzer. (New York: Holt and Company, 1911. Pp. 130.)

As vice-president of the International Institute of Sociology the author of this book deemed it worth while to refute the arguments advanced by the militarists in defence of war. He has done this in a manner fairly satisfactory—considering the small space at his disposal—to everyone except the militarists.

Insisting that war must be regarded not merely as a defensive operation but an offensive one as well, he reviews the objects of war as cannibalism, spoliation, intolerance and despotism; and argues that since none of these objects are beneficial they cannot justify warfare. Nor can war be justified as an end in itself; since 8000 wars have settled nothing, war is only very exceptionally if ever a solution of international difficulties.

The physiological effect of war is, not to aid in the destruction of the unfit, but to destroy the bravest and the physically best; not to enable the victors to marry the women and produce a cross-breeding favorable to the race, but to enable the least brave and therefore the unskilled among the victors, and the fugitives and weaklings among the defeated, to become the fathers of the race. The physically defective are rejected

by recruiting officers, and it is precisely these whose offspring are most numerous. Military exercise cannot compare with athletic sports in improving the animal man, and the practice of athletics is in inverse ratio to militarism, as the experience of England and Germany proves.

The economic cause of wars is the deeply imbedded notion that wealth can be procured more easily by seizing the possessions of others than by producing it oneself. But this is a fallacy, for war has always cost more capital and labor than would have been requisite for the production of an amount of wealth equal to the spoils of the war. The capital invested in the maintenance of Europe's armaments is equivalent to twenty-one billions of dollars, which exceeds that invested in any other of the world's industries, except railways; preparations for warfare, therefore, are also a costly diversion of the means of production.

The political justification of warfare is that national unity is founded upon it, as, for example, that of Germany. But warfare prevented German unity for nearly nine centuries; and German unity, as well as every nation's unity, has come only when a peaceful, legal means of settling disputes has taken the place of warfare. The larger union of the eighteen powers of Europe today is prevented by their claim to the right of declaring war whenever it seems good to them—as was the case with the five hundred German principalities of the old régime. Linguistic unity and territorial immensity do not insure popular welfare nearly so much as does international security and civilization in general; and these can best be attained in the absence of warfare, and by means the precise opposite of it.

Intellectual stagnation is not the result of peace, nor is war the cause of intellectual productivity, which follows, rather upon economic productivity. War has checked economic productivity; it has destroyed communities more especially devoted to intellectual pursuits, as for example Athens, Florence and the Flemish cities; and the most warlike of nations have shown the least evidence of scientific spirit. The economic burden of war reduced the potential leisure and the intellectual appreciation of the world; while war itself has hindered normal migration and the normal admixture of races, and has thereby retarded humanity's intellectual progress.

War, it is asserted, promotes self-sacrifice and many other moral virtues; but war is robbery, murder, violence of all kinds; war is hell; and virtues do not flourish in hell. The warlike nations are not the most moral, the peaceful nations the most corrupt. War is a reversion to animalism, which demoralizes both victors and vanquished. Even

if war did promote the virtues, should it be engaged in for that purpose, any more than cholera or diphtheria germs should be spread so that physicians should have the opportunity of giving proof of their devotion to humanity? War is not the cause of the highest kind of struggles; this is caused by the inextinguishable effort of humanity to fulfill economic, political, intellectual and moral needs. If struggle, therefore, is the source of virtue, its most prolific source is to be found in other than military struggle.

Such is a résumé of Mr. Novicow's arguments against war, between the lines of which countless similar arguments are suggested; and the reader of this little book lays it down with the impression that here was a David of dynamite destroying a Goliath of straw, a trip-hammer killing a fly—even though, like most Davids and most trip-hammers, it has some soft spots and weak places.

W. I. HULL.

*Universal Peace—War is Mesmerism.* By A. E. STILWELL.  
New York: Bankers' Publishing Company, 1911. Pp. 178.)

This book was inspired by the gift of the Peace Palace at The Hague, it is dedicated to the donor of that Palace (whom the author desires to see elected to the presidency of the United States), and it opens with an appeal to the sovereigns of Great Britain, the German Empire and Russia, to make warfare impossible.

The means suggested for the accomplishment of this universally desired object are: the substitution of secretaries of peace for secretaries of war; the devotion of the cost of one warship to an exchange of friendly visits, and of the cost of armaments to "sending young men to all parts of the world to study business" (Germany could thus "keep an army of peace numbering 312,000 in foreign countries developing German trade relations"); the cessation of armament increase and upkeep for fifteen years; an agreement for a two years' warning before commencing hostilities; a mutual payment to insure each other's peace—as payments are made to foreign insurance companies against fire; the annual reduction of armaments by 10 per cent each year, and the placing of the remaining one-tenth under an international flag to enforce, if necessary, the Hague Tribunal's decrees; and in particular, the abolition of the Monroe Doctrine and the consequent opportunity afforded the strong powers—preferably Great Britain, the United States and Holland, which proved their ability in this direction—to substitute clean, up-to-date govern-